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The Return of Soviet Emigres to the USSR [redacted] 25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

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SOV 87-10015X
February 1987
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Directorate of Intelligence

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The Return of Soviet Emigres to the USSR

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Division, SOVA,

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The Return of Soviet Emigres to the USSR

Key Judgments

Information available as of 24 February 1987 was used in this report.

In a policy shift, Moscow has allowed over 150 "third wave" emigres to return to the USSR since late October 1986. Most, if not all, of the returnees had first applied to return years ago but had their applications denied. These emigres, almost all of whom were in the United States, apparently had trouble adapting to life here and were genuinely unhappy. According to rumors in the emigre community as well as claims by Soviet spokesmen, a total of about 1,000 emigres—out of over 80,000 who have come to the United States since 1970—have submitted applications to return.

The Soviet Union has generally denied requests for repatriation except during two repatriation campaigns in the 1920s and 1950s directed at earlier "waves" of emigration. The present campaign is less comprehensive than those, but apparently includes some economic and legal inducements—primarily assistance in finding housing and employment and promises of no legal penalties for having "deserted" the motherland. Several prominent cultural figures who had emigrated or defected to the West—all of whom had been blacklisted during the Brezhnev era—have been contacted personally by emissaries from the Soviet cultural world and invited to return to the USSR, but as yet none have accepted the offer.

Moscow has been orchestrating the emigres' return for propaganda gain—having them return in groups over a limited period of time to give the illusion of a large exodus, setting up staged interviews with Western reporters, and publishing accounts of emigres' personal hardship in the domestic and emigre-targeted press. One family immediately returned to the United States after Soviet authorities dictated what they should say to reporters upon disembarking in Moscow. Stepped-up denunciations of life in the West fit in with the broader human rights counteroffensive conducted by General Secretary Gorbachev since 1985.

Moscow's implicit acknowledgment that all who disagree with select Soviet policies and leave the USSR are not "traitors to the motherland" is part of Gorbachev's campaign to convince the intelligentsia that he is serious about "democratizing" Soviet society. No Soviet leader since Khrushchev has put as much effort into courting intellectuals, suggesting that Gorbachev believes their support is important for the success of his domestic revitalization program.

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The decision to allow some repatriation is probably related to the reassessment of emigration policy that appears to be taking place. There are indications the Soviets are seeking a way to ease up on emigration restrictions without encouraging a large-scale movement among Jews to apply for exit visas. If the Soviets are planning to relax restrictions somewhat, they may hope that testimony provided by the returnees about hardships encountered in the West might reduce the number of citizens interested in leaving. They may also believe that such testimony will buttress their claims that the West grossly overstates the number of Jews who want to leave the USSR, and enable them to portray a limited increase in emigration as the beginning of an open-door policy.

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In repatriation policy, as in other policies in the human rights area, Gorbachev is attempting to balance his desire to burnish the regime's image at home and abroad with his desire to maintain ultimate political control over the "movement of people and ideas." Although he has demonstrated a remarkable willingness to make concessions to win over the Soviet intelligentsia and a high degree of political ingenuity in taking initiatives that score propaganda points in the eyes of the world, over time it may prove increasingly difficult for Gorbachev to balance these fundamentally irreconcilable objectives.

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The Return of Soviet Emigres to the USSR

Recent Initiatives To Encourage Emigres To Return

According to our best count, 155 Soviet emigres and their children have returned to the USSR since late October 1986.[1] Almost all had come to the United States during the "third wave" emigration of the 1970s. According to a Soviet spokesman, most of the returnees are Jews. They cover a span of ages and occupations.

Moscow is taking a series of steps to encourage some emigres to return to the USSR and is carefully orchestrating the process for maximum propaganda effect. The principal policy change has been to approve outstanding applications for repatriation. According to Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov, Moscow decided last year to start treating requests for repatriation more favorably. Soviet Consul General to the United States Vladimir Kuleshov recently claimed that "people will be leaving practically every day."

Rather than act on applications individually over time, however, Moscow since October has granted approvals in blocks and has arranged for the emigres to return in groups to give the illusion of a large exodus. Most, if not all, of the recent returnees first applied to return to the USSR several years ago but were refused. *Izvestiya* claims that some made their request within months of their arrival in the United States in the 1970s.

The Soviets appear to have contacted emigres personally in some cases. Soviet Embassy recently invited emigres interested in returning to come to Washington and discuss their situation with consular officers.

There are no indications that threats or other sinister tactics have been employed. The FBI has determined that the "third wave" emigration includes a few fully recruited intelligence agents as well as many others who were led to believe that permission to emigrate was contingent on their willingness to act as intelligence informants or co-optees at some time in the future.

Inducements for repatriation evidently include promises of economic security. Some of the emigres going back told Western reporters that they had been assured there would be no problems securing housing and employment in their hometowns. Several said that they had already been allotted apartments in Moscow, a prized commodity in a city where citizens without political connections often wait on housing lists for years. According to Gerasimov, the delay in bringing back more of the emigres who have allegedly applied to return is due to the need to find them housing and jobs, a task being handled by local authorities. The appropriate ministries are giving returnees priority over other Soviet citizens, A Soviet official announced at the Moscow airport that buses and hotel rooms were waiting for those without relatives in Moscow.

[1] TASS announced on 23 February 1987 that "around 200 people have returned to the Soviet Union lately."

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It is possible the Soviets have defrayed transportation costs. We have no evidence of this, but it seems likely that many of the returnees, most of whom worked in the United States as laborers and returned with children, could not afford the airfare on their own.

There are some indications the Soviets may allow emigres to exchange dollars for scarce luxury items if they return to the USSR. In early January 1987, a New York law firm announced in *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, a widely read Russian-language emigre newspaper, that they had negotiated an official agreement with the Soviet Union whereby dollars can be deposited through the law firm into an account. They can then be converted at a favorable exchange rate into special rubles that can be used by dependent relatives still in the USSR to buy two- and three-room cooperative apartments ($6,500 to $9,000), Lada or Volga automobiles ($2,100 to $4,500), and other durable goods—apparently without the several-year wait that usually applies to these items. It is not clear whether emigres can draw on such funds themselves, but many may try to have relatives acquire goods to be shared or transferred upon the emigres' return to the USSR.

the recent returnees were encouraged to bring with them as many dollars as possible, which could be exchanged for rubles in order to buy cooperative apartments.

Finally, the Soviets appear to have provided assurances of immunity from any legal penalties or restrictions. Although Soviet propaganda has traditionally referred to emigration as "betrayal of the motherland," one of the returnees told Western reporters in New York that "Soviet authorities here say we should not have any problems with the authorities there." According to the Western press, Radio Moscow reported that the returnees may leave the USSR again if they so desire. Of the recent returnees, one family of five and two other individuals immediately changed their minds on arriving in Moscow, and the Soviets allowed them to go back to the United States. The authorities may have made this decision because of the particular circumstances; Western media coverage of the returnees was heavy, and the Soviets probably did not want to spoil the propaganda effect by refusing the request of these few. But the action may have convinced many emigres that a decision to repatriate to the USSR is not irrevocable. 25X1

Appeals to Prominent Russian Cultural Figures 25X1

Well-known Russian artists and writers living in Western exile have been particular targets of the campaign to entice emigres and defectors back to the USSR. The Soviets have recently made individual approaches to some of these cultural figures, while using the official media to make more general overtures. 25X1

In recent months, according to Western press reports and US Embassy sources, Soviet intellectuals visiting the West have contacted a number of their colleagues in exile with the message that their return to the Soviet Union would be welcomed. Among those contacted were theater director Yuriy Lyubimov, sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, writers Viktor Nekrasov and Vassily Aksyonov, ballet dancers Mikhail Baryshnikov and Natalia Makarova, and film director Andrey Tarkovskiy (recently deceased). Some of the contacts have claimed to be speaking in the name of the leadership: 25X1

- A CPSU official, whom Neizvestny knows personally, visited Neizvestny's mother in the USSR. The official passed the message that General Secretary Gorbachev had Neizvestny in mind to build a World War II memorial in Moscow. 25X1

- The artistic director of the Bolshoi Ballet visited Mikhail Baryshnikov in New York in late January and claimed that he had "official sanction" from the Soviet Government to invite him to dance at the Bolshoi.

- After Lyubimov's former students at the Taganka Theater delivered an appeal to Gorbachev, Soviet Embassy officials in Washington telephoned Lyubimov and suggested they discuss the possibility of his returning. 25X1

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No direct official invitations or specific assurances about professional opportunities and working conditions have as yet been issued. The use of intermediaries allows Soviet authorities to "test the waters" without risking an embarrassing rebuff or absolutely committing themselves to honor any informal promises. Thus far, none of the individuals approached have returned.

A number of articles in the Soviet press have reinforced the message purveyed through these personal visits. For example, in an unusual, laudatory obituary for Tarkovskiy in early January, TASS lamented the continued exile abroad of Russian cultural figures and praised works by Tarkovskiy that originally had been banned in the Soviet Union. A week later, a Soviet film critic wrote that, had Andrey Tarkovskiy returned home, there would have been "no obstacle in his way to the audiences, to the people."

Why a Policy Change Now?

These efforts to encourage repatriation constitute a shift in Soviet behavior. The two previous "waves" of Soviet emigration also led to temporary repatriation campaigns in the 1920s and mid-1950s. During most periods of Soviet history, including recent years, however, Soviet emigres (that is, Soviet citizens who leave the USSR legally) generally have not been allowed to return. While the regime has always wanted to secure the return of defectors (that is, Soviet citizens who leave the USSR illegally), the current blandishments to cultural defectors are strikingly different from standard Soviet practice. Until now, the Soviets have encouraged redefection only on their own terms. Few redefectors in recent years have returned to any semblance of ordinary life.

The change in repatriation policy appears to be part of a broader effort by Gorbachev to strengthen his support among reform-minded intellectuals and officials. Gorbachev also wants to persuade foreign audiences that he is serious about "democratizing" the Soviet system. Finally, the use of repatriates for propaganda purposes reflects a desire to reduce the average Soviet citizen's attraction to things Western.

Gorbachev has gone to further lengths to court the intelligentsia than any other Soviet leader since Khrushchev. Like his campaign for "openness" in Soviet media, the partial relaxation of censorship in cultural works, and the bold move to release Andrey Sakharov, Gorbachev's effort to seek a reconciliation with the emigre community is undoubtedly prompted in part by a belief that the cooperation of the intelligentsia is needed if his program for revitalizing the system and modernizing the economy is to succeed. He may also hope that increasing his personal popularity among intellectuals and lower level elites who favor broad systemic changes will enable him to step up pressure on his Politburo colleagues to go along with his policy initiatives. 25X1

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The Soviet effort to get propaganda mileage out of the emigres who have returned thus far is in keeping with a human rights counteroffensive under way since 1985. This counteroffensive has sought to deflect attention from Soviet abuses by accusing the West of its own human rights violations—especially racism, unemployment, and poverty. In 1985 the Soviets published a white book compiling individual stories about Soviet emigres' painful separation from the homeland, their "lure" to the West by "Zionist propaganda," and their encounters with poverty, unemployment, crime, and uncertainty about the future. The frequency of articles on emigres' disenchantment with the West—with particular attention toward those individuals who chose to return to the USSR—has increased considerably since then. The increase has been evident both in the domestic press and in *Golos Rodiny*, the Soviet paper distributed in emigre communities abroad. In September 1986, the regime made the bold decision to televise a US documentary on the life of Soviet emigres, apparently having judged that testimony about the difficulties of adjusting to a different culture would have a greater impression on viewers than the higher US living standard evident in the film. 25X1

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Apparently as a condition of returning, repatriates have participated in staged interviews with the Western press, which have focused on the shortcomings of

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life in capitalist countries. There have been no opportunities for returnees to discuss their motivations with reporters without Soviet supervision. Soviet officials arranged three press conferences for returnees from the United States and Canada at Soviet diplomatic missions in late October and November. Members of the large group of about 50 emigres that left on 29 December refused to speak to reporters at the airport in New York unless an Aeroflot representative (perhaps from the KGB?) was present. At the airport in Moscow, about 20 of this group were ferried into a special press room to facilitate interviews with Soviet and foreign journalists. Two weeks later, the Foreign Ministry press office declined a Western reporter's request for followup interviews, claiming that all of the December returnees had left Moscow.

The family of returnees that immediately reversed their decision and returned to the United States had been given prepared statements to deliver upon arrival in Moscow, and one family member was instructed to throw her US passport on the floor. Another family, while out of earshot of the "Aeroflot" escort in New York, confided to a reporter that its permission to return was contingent on an agreement to go on a publicity tour in the USSR.

The decision to allow some repatriation is probably related to the reassessment of emigration policy that appears to be taking place. There are indications the Soviets are seeking a way to ease up on emigration restrictions without encouraging a large-scale movement among Jews to apply for exit visas. Soviet officials are talking publicly about reconsidering up to 10,000 applications for emigration that were previously denied, and the Foreign Ministry claims that about 500 exit visas were awarded in January 1987—half the number for all of 1986. But some officials are privately expressing concern that relaxing emigration restrictions could result in a flood of requests to leave.

If the Soviets are planning to relax restrictions somewhat, they may hope that testimony provided by the returnees about hardships encountered in the West will reduce the number of citizens interested in applying (although those who would not consider emigration because they would never see friends or family again might be emboldened to apply in light of the new evidence that emigration apparently is not irrevocable). They may also believe that such testimony will buttress their claims that the West grossly overstates the number of Jews who want to leave the USSR, and enable them to portray a limited increase in emigration as the beginning of an open-door policy.

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Prospects for More Repatriation

According to statistics of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, over 80,000 Soviet citizens came to the United States during the "third wave" emigration that began about 1970. The coverage of returning emigres in the Soviet press over the years leads us to estimate that the number who have returned is not higher than the low hundreds. Authoritative Soviet spokesmen—including Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov, and chief CSCE delegate Kashlev—have announced over the last four months that about 1,000 Soviet emigres in the United States and several hundred in other, unspecified Western countries have requested to return to the Soviet Union. It is also rumored in the emigre community that over 1,000 emigres in the United States have submitted applications to return,

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Soviet authorities have not as yet granted a blanket amnesty permitting all emigres who want to return to do so. Moscow radio, broadcasting in English to North America, has said that Moscow will continue to treat applications favorably. But Consul General Kuleshov remarked in late October that permission to return is not automatic, and Moscow radio (broadcasting domestically in Russian) repeated in early January that "the road to the homeland is not by any means open to all of those who would like to say goodbye to the free world." Thus, Moscow presumably will continue to attach strings to repatriation by making returns contingent on returnees publicly apologizing for leaving and expressing gratitude to the Soviet Government for allowing them to come home.

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Expressions of willingness to shed US citizenship have been a theme repeated by the latest returnees. If the Soviets are pressuring them to make such statements, this could be a maneuver to make it harder for them to turn around and go back to the United States unless they attempt to do so immediately after arrival. Until their Soviet citizenship is restored, Moscow cannot restrain those emigres who had acquired US citizenship from leaving the USSR without violating consular agreements. After receiving Soviet citizenship, the returnees would need to process new emigration applications through the Soviet bureaucracy to leave again.

Disaffected emigres who have not yet applied to return are taking a wait-and-see attitude and will pay close attention to the treatment afforded those who have recently returned. For a variety of reasons, many emigres may decide to go back if they become convinced they will not be treated poorly in the USSR. Large numbers of Soviet emigres have had serious problems adjusting to life in the United States. Some of these problems—the difficulty of learning a new language, for example—affect emigres to and from any country. Others are specific to emigres from the USSR.

Many Soviet emigres complain of the impersonalism of life in large US cities. They miss the close friendships characteristic of Soviet society that provided them with strong personal support systems.

A large number of the returnees claimed they wanted to be reunited with family members still in the USSR. For example, one woman who intends to return has told reporters that, when she left the USSR, she anticipated that her daughter ultimately would be able to join her in the United States, but the Soviet Government has repeatedly denied her daughter an exit visa. Others who have recently returned had similar dashed hopes. Several emigres have reported, however, that since December 1986 Moscow has been granting tourist visas to emigres for visits to the USSR, and a few emigres have already visited the USSR and returned without incident. This might limit the number who repatriate chiefly to end their separation from relatives and friends in the USSR.

Soviet citizens tend to be psychologically unprepared for the competitiveness, emphasis on individual initiative, and degree of choice that accompany life in the United States. Coming from a society that guides one's choices from cradle to grave, many are overwhelmed by the alternatives available in housing, education, and consumer goods. Emigres who worked in commonplace technical fields, such as engineering and medicine, in the USSR are inadequately trained to enter those fields in the United States. Others, such as teachers and social scientists, were trained in theories and methods not widely accepted in Western society. Because they were limited to employment in blue-collar jobs, the standard of living of several of the emigres who returned, particularly those who were elderly, was reportedly low. Even those whose material conditions are superior in the United States sometimes find their underemployment and drop in social status unacceptable.

Soviet emigres tend to form ethnic ghettos in large urban centers and are exposed to a crime rate far exceeding that in the USSR. Soviet propaganda devotes much attention to the extent of violent crime in the United States, and a large number of recent returnees have publicly cited their personal victimization as a major reason for returning. While Soviet authorities may have directed the returnees to exaggerate this point, the complaints are often genuine. According to FBI records, for example, one of the returnees who cited crime as his reason for leaving was shot during a street robbery in 1982 and applied for repatriation soon afterward.

For many Russian expatriates, the emotional pull of the *rodina* (motherland) predisposes them to consider going back if they judge that internal conditions in the USSR have improved. Over the past decade, about one Soviet defector in 10 has redefected, even though many of them had good reason to believe they would "face the music" when they returned. In a statement representative of the attitude of many redefectors, said he felt compelled to redefect because, although he was still not in agreement with the Communist regime, his "soul would know peace only on Russian soil."

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For many Russian cultural figures in exile, the lure of the motherland is reinforced by the cultural thaw that is under way in the USSR. Although, for some artists and writers, financial incentives were a factor in their decision to leave the USSR, for most of them a desire for greater artistic freedom was paramount. They have therefore been carefully following developments under Gorbachev's policy of increased *glasnost* (openness) in the cultural arena. While many of these emigres have received critical acclaim in the West, several, especially those who deal in the written word, have expressed disappointment in not being able to create for their native Russian audience and could be susceptible to calls for help in revitalizing morale in their native society. Lyubimov has stated that he is considering the Soviets' indirect offers because "I am needed there, not here." 25X1

If any prominent artists were to return to the USSR, it would almost certainly be only with the guarantee that their creativity would not be constrained by censorship and that they would have the right to travel regularly to and from the West. Gorbachev has allowed a few intellectuals, such as poets Andrey Vosnesensky and Yevgeny Yevtushenko, to travel to the West with increasing frequency and to publish controversial works. But Gorbachev probably sees Vosnesensky and Yevtushenko as goodwill ambassadors who serve the purpose of promoting his image in the West as a Soviet "liberal," and he may be unwilling to accord similar privileges to other cultural luminaries. If Gorbachev were to accede to the conditions being demanded by exiled artists, it would set a precedent that could heighten expectations among intellectuals—many of whom keenly desire greater opportunities for foreign travel—beyond the regime's ability to satisfy them. 25X1

In repatriation policy, as in other policies in the broad human rights area, Gorbachev is attempting to balance his desire to burnish the regime's image at home and abroad with his desire to maintain ultimate political control over the "movement of people and ideas." Although he has demonstrated a remarkable willingness to make concessions to win over the Soviet intelligentsia and a high degree of political ingenuity in taking initiatives that score propaganda points in the eyes of the world, over time it may prove increasingly difficult for him to balance these fundamentally irreconcilable objectives. 25X1

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Appendix

Previous Repatriation Policy

There has always been a natural tension between the Soviets' interest in making emigration irrevocable, to discourage others from considering that path, and in allowing some emigres to return as a testament to propaganda claims that life in the West is undesirable. As a result of this tension, Soviet repatriation policy has not been without ambiguity. But, during most periods of Soviet history, emigres have usually been denied reentry.

Emigres are stripped of Soviet citizenship upon leaving the USSR. Until recently, emigres were usually not even allowed to apply for repatriation. For example, in 1976 Moscow had given concrete instructions not to accept new applications for repatriation and to halt the processing of received applications, as there would be no permissions granted that year. Emigres who have periodically applied to return have reported that even those applications that have been accepted have generally resulted in formal rejection after a long processing period—about eight months.

Some exceptions have been made, and those who return are exploited for propaganda gain. Over the past several years, the Soviet domestic press has published about one article per month about returning emigres.[2] US prosecutors claimed that convicted spy Svetlana Ogordnikova had wanted to return to the USSR and was told by the KGB to "earn" her way back by convincing emigres to repatriate and by locating defectors, among other things. 25X1

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The incentives for wanting defectors back have always been considerably greater than for wanting emigres back: 25X1

- In the case of positive intelligence defectors, redefection may limit the amount of classified information that passes to foreign governments, while offering the opportunity of debriefing that may provide information about the modus operandi of Western intelligence services. 25X1

- The regime wants to demonstrate its power and ability to punish those who violate Soviet law. Thus, redefectors in recent years have usually received long prison terms. 25X1

- The Soviet leadership probably believes that the political statement made by defection, which by its character is seen as a more desperate attempt to escape from Soviet society, is stronger than that made by emigration and must be more forcefully countered. Because of a generally held impression that emigration is a Jewish phenomenon, many Soviet citizens have negative feelings toward emigration, rooted in anti-Semitism. But defection affects various groups in Soviet society, including the party, government, and cultural elite. 25X1

Thus, the Soviets have employed a variety of inducements and threats to encourage redefection. They have traditionally tried to foster homesickness in defectors by forwarding letters from family members 25X1

[2] The Soviet Union also maintains an official Soviet Committee on Cultural Ties With Compatriots Abroad (also called the *Rodina*, or motherland, society). Its primary activity has been the publication since 1955 of *Golos Rodiny* (Voice of the Motherland), a weekly newspaper written specifically for circulation in emigre communities in 83 countries. (From 1955 to 1960, the newspaper was issued under the title *Za Vozvrashchenie na Rodinu*, For the Returning to the Motherland.) It includes cultural news, elaborate claims of Soviet political and social accomplishments, and letters from homesick compatriots who regret that circumstances (usually World War II) separated them from the Soviet Union. From 1960 until at least the late 1970s, the committee also sponsored *Golos Rodiny* foreign radiobroadcasts that sometimes included personalized messages to individual emigres from their relatives still in the Soviet Union.

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still in the USSR and selectively allowing phone calls to family members to get through. Threatened retribution against family members, such as the denial of medical care or employment, has also been used to coerce some defectors to return. Firsthand accounts of redefections in the Soviet media are designed to persuade the population that the individual did not choose life in the West of his own free will but was either duped or abducted by hostile governments.

Past Repatriation Campaigns

During the 1920s and the mid-1950s, the usual prohibition against emigres returning was temporarily lifted. During these periods, the Soviet Union embarked on a multifaceted campaign to undermine the emigrations as an external anti-Soviet political force. The methods employed included the granting of a general amnesty from the crime of deserting the motherland, the circulation within emigre communities of newspapers and pamphlets encouraging return, personalized letters and radio appeals to individual emigres, personal visits from Soviets traveling abroad, and threats of reprisal against relatives and friends still in the USSR. In a few cases, emigre leaders were kidnaped and subsequent statements from the USSR denouncing the emigre movement were attributed to them.

Appeals to the exile community were designed to play on the national feelings of the expatriates, to convince them that a basic change of policy and conditions had taken place in the Soviet Union (in the 1920s, with the New Economic Policy, and, in the 1950s, with de-Stalinization) and to convey the impression that returning was danger free. In the 1920s, special attention was concentrated on luring back the intelligentsia, who were called on to "work with the whole people for the reconstruction of the country." Strong Russian nationalism motivated many of the intellectual repatriates, who included writers Alexey Tolstoy, Nikolay Gogol, Ivan Kuprin, and Marina Tsvetayeva.

In 1921, 121,000 emigres returned to the USSR, followed by 60,000 over the next eight years. Between January 1955 and February 1956, 245 emigres returned to the USSR.

In some respects these two earlier repatriation campaigns resemble the one that is now emerging. Both came at a time when the party was embarking on economic or political reform, moving to relax strictures on cultural life, attempting to build bridges to the intelligentsia, and seeking to forge a bond between the regime and society.

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In other regards the earlier campaigns were conducted under political circumstances that were strikingly different:

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- In both of the earlier periods the Soviet leadership probably regarded the emigration as a serious subversive threat to the regime.

- The character of the emigration was different. The earlier emigration waves included many Russians as well as members of minority Soviet nationalities, rather than mostly Jews. Also, many of those who returned to the USSR might have been people displaced by war—the Civil War of the 1920s and World War II.

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